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Abstract 
Inequality and gender economic exclusion are major policy concerns facing sub-Saharan Africa in 
the post-2015 development agenda. The study provides critical masses of inequality that should 
not be exceeded if governance is to promote gender economic participation. The research focuses 
on 42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa using annual data spanning from 2004 to 2014. The 
empirical evidence is based on the Generalized Method of Moments. The following findings are 
established. First, inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) levels that completely nullify the positive 
effect of governance on female labour force participation are 0.708 for political stability, 0.601 for 
voice & accountability, 0.588 for government effectiveness, 0.631 for regulatory quality, 0.612 
for the rule of law, and 0.550 for corruption-control. Second, inequality thresholds at which female 
unemployment can no longer be mitigated by governance channels include: 0.561 (for political 
stability) and 0.465 (for the rule of law). Third, inequality levels that completely dampen the 
positive impact of governance on female employment are 0.608 for political stability, 0.580 for 
voice & accountability, 0.581 for government effectiveness, and 0.557 for the rule of law. As the 
main policy implication, for good governance to promote gender economic inclusion, inequality 
levels should not exceed established thresholds.  
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1. Introduction 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it is exclusively by 
addressing the apparent issue of income inequality in Africa that the continent can achieve 
sustainable poverty reduction and progress significantly towards the attainment of Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in the post-2015 development agenda (UNDP, 2017).  The 
conclusions of the UNDP are consistent with the contemporary empirical literature. For instance, 
Bicaba, Brixiova and Ncube (2017) have concluded that, it is unlikely for countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) to achieve the SDG threshold of reducing extreme poverty to below 3% unless 
inequality is addressed:  “This paper examines its feasibility for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the 
world’s poorest but growing region. It finds that under plausible assumptions extreme poverty will 
not be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can be reduced to low levels through high growth and 
income redistribution towards the poor segments of the society” (p. 93).  A significant contribution 
to the underlying inequality in SSA is the exclusion of the female gender from the formal economic 
sector3 (Efobi, Tanakem & Asongu, 2018). While good governance is relevant in addressing 
female economic exclusion, existing levels of inequality can affect the effectiveness of such 
governance measures in the promotion of gender participation in the formal economic sector 
(Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2015; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a)4. Such underpinnings motivate the 
positioning of this study on inequality thresholds that crowd-out the favourable effect of good 
governance on female economic inclusion in SSA. Having clarified the background for this 
research, it is relevant to critically engage and substantiate factors motivating the positioning of   
this study, notably: (i) the policy and scholarly concerns of inequality and gender exclusion in SSA 
in the light of the SDGs; (ii) the documented relevance of good governance in driving inclusive 
development outcomes and (iii) gaps in contemporary scholarly literature. The factors are 
substantiated in the same chronological order. 
 First, consistent with contemporary African scholarly and policy literature on inequality, 
inequality in SSA is a fundamental setback to sustainable development in the sub-region 
                                                          
3 The terms “gender inclusion”, “gender economic participation”, “female labour force participation”, “female 
employment”, “female economic participation” and “gender economic inclusion” are used interchangeably 
throughout the study 
4 It is important to note that the conclusions of Fosu are consistent with the position that, government actions in the 
promotion of inclusive development are hampared by existing levels of inequality.  
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(McGeown, 2017; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Asongu & le Roux, 
2019). Within this framework of inequality, the concern of gender exclusion underlying this study 
pertains to at least two SDGs, notably: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. “achieve gender equality and empower all 
women and girls”) and (ii) SDG 8 (i.e. “promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”). The concern of gender 
exclusion is particularly relevant to SSA because females in the sub-region are the poorest in the 
world (Hazel, 2010) and both the scholarly and policy research on the issue are consistent on the 
position that women in SSA are mostly involved in small trading activities, subsistence agriculture 
and domestic activities that are largely always unpaid (Ellis, Blackden, Cutura, MacCulloch & 
Seebens, 2007; FAO, 2011; International Labour Organisation, 2013; Tandon & Wegerif, 
2013;World Bank, 2015;  Efobi et al., 2018).  
 Second, good governance has been established to be an important channel through which 
economic and inclusive developments are enhanced in Africa (Efobi, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2016; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b). Moreover, the underlying literature broadly 
accords on the position that appropriate and robust governance initiatives are fundamental in the 
driving of economic prosperity and encouragement of private sector development, which entails 
job opportunities for the female gender in the formal economic sector. The governance variables 
which are defined in the data section logically attest to the fact that political, economic and 
institutional dimensions of governance are relevant in providing a favourable economic 
atmosphere for job creation and entrepreneurship. A recent World Bank report which has estimated 
the loss in income from the exclusion of women in the formal economic sector at about 2.5 trillion 
USD, has also recommended good governance in the formulation and implementation of 
appropriate policies that can curtail the exclusion of women in the formal economic sector (World 
Bank, 2018; Nkurunziza, 2018). The recommendations of the World Bank are taken on board in 
this study given that the governance channel is acknowledged and empirically engaged as a 
mechanism by which the participation of women in the formal economic sector can be enhanced, 
contingent on existing inequality levels. Moreover, the positioning of this research in light of the 
recommendation from the World Bank is also partly motivated by a gap in the extant literature.   
 Third,  as far as we have reviewed, the contemporary scholarly literature on gender 
equality in Africa has failed to engage the relevance of good governance in promoting economic 
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inclusion with particular emphasis on how income inequality affects the “good governance”-
“female inclusion” nexus. In the attendant literature, Ntayi, Munene and Malinga (2018) provide 
nexuses between financial access and mobile money with emphasis on moderation from gender 
and social networks. As argued by Uduji and Okolo-Obasi (2018), it is relevant to take women 
into consideration when implementing technology-driven policies designed to boost agricultural 
productivity in rural areas. Kairiza, Kiprono and Magadzire (2017) study the relationship between 
gender gaps and inclusive finance whereas Elu (2018) investigates the relevance of improving 
girls’ and women’s involvement in science studies. The importance of gender within informal and 
financial sectors is investigated by Bayraktar and Fofack (2018) while Mannah-Blankson (2018) 
focuses on the nexus between gender exclusion and financial access within the framework of 
microfinance. A strand of studies has investigated the importance of gender participation in 
agricultural development that is sustainable (Theriault, Smale & Haider, 2017) whereas another 
strand of research has been oriented towards the  importance of information and communication 
technology (ICT) in driving female employment either directly (Efobi et al., 2018) or indirectly 
by means of the financial access channel (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018a).  
Among the engaged literature, the study closest to this research is Efobi et al. (2018) who 
have concluded that ICT positively affects female employment in the following increasing order 
of magnitude: mobile phone penetration, internet penetration, and fixed broadband subscriptions. 
This study departs from Efobi et al. (2018) from two main perspectives. On the one hand, contrary 
to the use of ICT, inequality and governance are employed as the independent variables of interest, 
in the light of the motivation underpinning this research. On the other, the thresholds of inequality 
that dampen the positive effect of good governance on female employment are provided. 
Furthermore, on the latter departure from Efobi et al. (2018), this study argues that it is not enough 
to provide policy makers with findings based on magnitudes of direct effects between 
macroeconomic variables. In essence, in order to provide policy makers with more policy options, 
actionable policy measures should result from the findings. To this end, this research provides 
critical masses of inequality that should not be exceeded if governance is to promote female 
economic participation.  
 This is an applied economics study. Hence, the authors are fully cognizant of the issues 
related to engaging empirics without established theoretical underpinnings. However, the authors 
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also posit that applied economics should not exclusively be based on the premise of accepting or 
rejecting existing theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, conforming to a growing branch of the 
literature, this research is premised on the importance of applied econometrics in theory-building 
(Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). 
According to the attendant literature, applied econometrics that proceeds from sound intuition is a 
useful scientific activity. As substantiated throughout this introduction, the intuition underlying 
this research is simple to follow: existing levels of inequality affect the role of governance in 
promoting gender economic participation. Hence, it is relevant to assess maximum levels of 
inequality at which, good governance no longer promotes female economic inclusion.  
 It is worthwhile to further substantiate the intuition for the study by providing clarifications 
to two more tendencies motivating this study, notably: that economic inequality can affect 
governance structures and economic inequality can also affect the participation of women in the 
formal economic sector. Accordingly, the attendant literature is consistent on the position that the 
responsiveness of government-tailored inclusive policies to economic prosperity is hampered by 
existing levels of income inequality. To put this intuition into more perspective:   “The study finds 
that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, 
p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the 
inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 
2010c, p. 1432); and “In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth 
in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of 
growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). These conclusions from Fosu are relevant in motivating the study 
because income-driven policies from governments are designed to ultimately promote inclusive 
development. 
 In light of the above, the corresponding research question this study aims to answer is the 
following: what levels or thresholds of inequality completely nullify the positive incidence of 
governance on female economic inclusion? Two hypothetical premises are necessary to answer 
the question, notably: governance should positively affect inclusive economic participation while 
the interaction between governance and inequality should have the opposite effect.  
Hypothesis 1: there are positive unconditional effects from the incidence of governance on female 
economic inclusion. 
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Hypothesis 2: there are negative conditional effects from the interaction between governance and 
inequality on female economic inclusion.  
 The underlying hypotheses are partly supported with stylized facts on the nexuses between 
inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) and the dynamics of female economic participation. 
Accordingly, as apparent in Figure 1 from the left to the right, while the relationship between 
inequality and female economic participation is not very apparent (i.e. first graph): (i) there is a 
positive nexus between inequality and female unemployment (i.e. second graph) and (ii) a negative 
nexus between inequality and female employment (i.e. third graph).   
The rest of the research is organised in the following manner. Section 2 covers the data and 
methodology whilst the empirical findings are presented and discussed in section 3. The study 
concludes in section 4 with implications and future research directions.  
Figure 1: Inequality and Female Economic Participation  
   
 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
This research focuses on 42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa using annual data spanning from 2004 
to 20145. These scopes of geography and periodicity are motivated by the justifications for the 
                                                          
5The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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research articulated in the introduction as well as data availability constraints at the time of the 
study. The data are obtained from four main sources. First, the inequality indicator which is the 
Gini coefficient is from the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP).  
 Second, borrowing from Efobi et al. (2018) which is partly motivating this research, three 
gender economic inclusion indicators from the International Labor Organisation are used, namely: 
female labor force participation, female unemployment rate and female employment rate6. Third, 
in line with recent African governance literature (Oluwatobi, Efobi, Olurinola, Alege, 2015; 
Andres, Asongu & Amavilah 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b; Tchamyou, 2017; Asongu, 
le Roux, Nwachukwu & Pyke, 2019), six governance indicators are sourced from World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank, namely:  (i) political stability, “voice & accountability” 
(components of political governance), (ii) regulatory quality, government effectiveness 
(constituents of economic governance), (iii) corruption-control and the rule of law (components  
of institutional governance). Accordingly: “The first concept is about the process by which those 
in authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice and accountability and 
political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of government to formulate and 
implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic Governance): regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness. The last, but by no means least, regards the respect for citizens and the 
state of institutions that govern the interactions among them (Institutional Governance): rule of 
law and control of corruption” (Andres et al., 2015, p. 1041). 
 Fourth, two main control variables are adopted from the World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank, namely: mobile phone penetration and remittances. These indicators are 
motivated by contemporary African inclusive development literature (Efobi et al., 2018; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018b; Tchamou et al., 2019).   The expected signs 
are contingent on country-specific effects that are not considered in the estimation exercise because 
the adopted GMM approach is designed such that country-specific effects are eliminated in order 
to prevent the concern of endogeneity which results from the correlation between the lagged 
outcome variable and country-specific effects. However, in accordance with the attendant 
empirical literature, mobile phone penetration is expected to increase female labour force 
                                                          
6 While the gender economic inclusion indicators are obtained from a credible source such as the International Labour 
Organisation, the claim that three indicators of gender economic inclusion are used may also be doubtful. For example, 
the measurement of female unemployment rate can simply be the opposite of female employment rate (i.e. 100 minus 
female employment rate).   
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participation and female employment while it is also anticipated to decrease female 
unemployment. Concerning remittances, Meniago and Asongu (2018) have recently established 
that they increase inequality in Africa because majority of the population moving abroad from the 
continent are from rich households. Consequently, when funds are remitted to Africa, these funds 
end-up improving the financial standing of rich households, ceteris paribus. The narrative on 
inequality has been confirmed within the framework of female exclusion by Asongu and 
Odhiambo (2018a). 
 Concerns may arise as to why variables in the conditioning information set are limited to 
two. It is worthwhile to note that, such restriction of elements in the conditioning information set 
in order to avoid concerns of instrument proliferation is not uncommon in the empirical literature, 
in so far as the motivation for such restriction is to obtain valid models and robust coefficients. 
Cases in GMM-centric literature that are relevant in substantiating this perspective include: (i) 
Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini (2012) who have used two control variables as in this study and 
(ii) Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) who have not used any 
control variable. The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1 whereas the 
summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is covered in Appendix 3. 
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 GMM Specification 
Borrowing from recent GMM-centric literature, the GMM empirical approach is adopted for this 
study because of four main fundamental factors (Meniago & Asongu, 2018; Tchamyou, 2019a, 
2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019; Agoba, Abor, Osei, & Sa-Aadu, 2019; Fosu & Abass, 2019). (i) In 
this research, the number of sampled countries (i.e. N) far exceeds the number of periods in each 
cross section (i.e. T). Hence, the N>T condition warranted for the employment of the strategy is 
met. (ii) Persistence is exhibited by the outcome variables of female economic inclusion because 
the correlations between first lag and level series’ are higher than 0.800 which is the rule of thumb 
threshold for confirming persistence in a variable (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019b, 2019c). (iii) The 
panel data strucure of the research informs the study that cross-country differences are taken on 
board in the estimations. (iv) The concern of endogeneity is also addressed by the study because, 
on the one hand, reverse causality or simultaneity is tackled with the use of internal instruments 
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and on the other; the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled by means of time-invariant omitted 
indicators.   
            The GMM approach adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) strategy which 
has been documented to limit the proliferation of instruments. The following equations in level (1) 
and first difference (2) summarise the standard system GMM estimation procedure.  
tititititititititi RMGIIGFEFE ,,6,5,4,3,2,10,                    
(1)                             
 
)()()()(
)()()()(
,,,,6,,5
,,4,,3,,22,,1,,








tititttitititi
titititititititititi
RRMM
GIGIIIGGFEFEFEFE
          
(2)                                                                                                                              
 
where, tiFE , is an indicator of gender economic inclusion (i.e. female labour force participation, 
female unemployment rate and female employment rate) of  country i  in  period t , 0  
is a 
constant, G  entails governance (political stability, “voice & accountability”, regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control), I denotes the income inequality 
indicator or the Gini coefficient,  GI reflects interactions between governance  and inequality 
indicators (“political stability” × “the Gini coefficient”; “voice & accountability” × “the Gini 
coefficient”; “regulatory quality”×“the Gini coefficient”;“government effectiveness” × “the Gini 
coefficient”; “the rule of law”×“the Gini coefficient” and “corruption-control”× “the Gini 
coefficient”), M is mobile phone penetration, R is remittances, represents the coefficient of auto-
regression which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag appropriately 
captures past information, t is the time-specific constant, i is the country-specific effect and ti ,  
the error term.  
 
2.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 
          For a robust GMM specification, it is relevant to articulate the identification strategy as well 
as the exclusion restrictions that underpin the identification approach. This research is in 
accordance with contemporary GMM-centric literature in considering years as strictly exogenous 
and the independent variables (i.e. governance channels, inequality policy syndrome and control 
indicators) are predetermined or endogenous explaining (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; 
Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017;  Boateng et al., 2018;  Tchamyou et al., 2019). Roodman (2009b) 
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also argues in favour of this strategy by maintaining that years cannot become endogenous in a 
difference series7.   
                In light of the explanation above, the identification and exclusion restrictions are 
assessed on the basis of the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  The 
alternative hypothesis of this test is the position that the instruments are not exogenous whereas 
the corresponding null hypothesis is the stance that such instruments exhibit strict exogeneity. 
Therefore, in the findings that are reported in the empirical section, for this exclusion restriction 
assumption to hold, the null hypothesis of the DHT should not be rejected. The clarifications on 
identification and exclusion restrictions pertaining to validating the adopted instruments is not 
different from the criterion in traditional instrumental variable (IV) techniques which require that 
the null hypothesis of the Sargan/Hansen test should not be rejected in order for the instruments to 
be valid (Beck,Demirgüç-Kunt& Levine, 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d). 
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Presentation of results  
This section discloses the regressions results in Tables 1-3. Table 1 focuses on the nexus between 
inequality, governance and female labour force participation while Table 2 is concerned with 
linkages between inequality, governance and female unemployment. Table 3 focuses on 
connections between inequality, governance and female employment. The use of various 
governance and female economic inclusion variables is also a measure of robustness check. Each 
table is partitioned into three main fractions of governance, consisting of the following order: (i) 
political stability and “voice & accountability” (in the first category of political governance); (ii) 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality (in the second category on economic governance) 
and (iii) the rule of law and corruption-control (in the third category for institutional governance). 
  
              Four information criteria are used to examine the validity of estimated models8. In the 
light of these criteria, specifications in the 3rd and 4th columns of Table 2 are invalid. The invalidity 
                                                          
7Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
8 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation 
in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because 
their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is 
not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the 
proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, 
a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu& De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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is essentially based on the fact that the null hypotheses of the Hansen overidentifying restrictions 
tests are rejected. It is relevant to note that the Hansen test which is more robust than the Sargan 
test is weakened by the proliferation of instruments. This is not the case with the Sargan test which 
is not sensitive to instrument proliferation.  Hence, an approach through which the underlying 
conflict of interest is avoided is to adopt the Hansen test and ensure that instrument proliferation 
is limited. A criterion of limiting instrument proliferation is that instruments should be less than 
the number of cross sections in each specification.  
              This research follows the approach of Asongu (2018) in establishing thresholds of 
inequality that crowd-out the favourable impact of good governance on female economic 
inclusion. For instance in the last column of Table 1, the maximum value of inequality at which 
corruption-control positively affects female labour force participation 0.550 (2.559/4.646). In this 
computation, 2.559 is the unconditional effect of corruption-control on female labour force 
participation while 4.646 is the absolute value of the conditional effect from the interaction 
between corruption-control and the Gini coefficient. Hence, above a Gini coefficient threshold of 
0.550, the Gini coefficient completely crowds-out the positive unconditional effect of corruption-
control (i.e. 2.556) on female labour force participation. 
                 The following findings can be established from Tables 1-3.  First, inequality levels that 
completely nullify the positive effect of governance on female labour force participation are: 0.708 
(for political stability); 0.601 (“voice & accountability”); 0.588 (government effectiveness); 0.631 
(regulatory quality); 0.612 (rule of law) and 0.550 (for corruption-control). Second, inequality 
thresholds at which female unemployment can no longer be mitigated by governance channels are 
0.561 (for political stability) and 0.465 (for the rule of law). Third, inequality levels that completely 
dampen the positive effect of governance on female employment are 0.608 (for political stability), 
0.580 for voice & accountability, 0.581 for government effectiveness, and 0.557 for the rule of 
law. Most of the significant control variables display the expected signs.  
     
Table 1: Governance, Inequality and Female Labour Force Participation  
       
 Dependent variable: Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP) 
       
 Political Governance Economic  Governance Institutional  Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectivness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
FLFP (-1) 0.959*** 0.942*** 0.966*** 0.969*** 0.954*** 0.949*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) -0.523 4.658* 1.054 2.025 -2.785 3.158 
 (0.806) (0.085) (0.638) (0.452) (0.560) (0.220) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 1.486** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.042)      
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Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 7.818*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 4.151*** --- --- --- 
   (0.005)    
Regulatory quality (RQ) --- --- --- 4.887** --- --- 
    (0.011)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 6.821** --- 
     (0.038)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 2.559* 
      (0.051) 
Gini × PolS -2.097* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.097)      
Gini × VA --- -13.005*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Gini × GE --- --- -7.048*** --- --- --- 
   (0.006)    
Gini × RQ --- --- --- -7.742** --- --- 
    (0.015)   
Gini × RL --- --- --- --- -11.143** --- 
     (0.039)  
Gini × CC --- --- --- --- --- -4.646** 
      (0.037) 
Mobile Phone Penetration  -0.004** -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.029) (0.050) (0.500) (0.511) (0.124) (0.102) 
Remittances  -0.076*** -0.040*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.011 -0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.580) (0.003) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Thresholds 0.708 0.601 0.588 0.631 0.612 0.550 
       
AR(1) (0.042) (0.048) (0.056) (0.057) (0.067) (0.036) 
AR(2) (0.343) (0.222) (0.292) (0.319) (0.216) (0.429) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.191) (0.231) (0.015) (0.000) (0.006) 
Hansen OIR (0.419) (0.299) (0.368) (0.588) (0.428) (0.351) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.109) (0.167) (0.158) (0.171) (0.175) (0.120) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.680 (0.429) (0.536) (0.781) (0.590) (0.568) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.295) (0.410) (0.698) (0.481) (0.364) (0.470) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.504) (0.263) (0.206) (0.561) (0.451) (0.288) 
       
Fisher  245055*** 66215*** 3246.97*** 61249*** 1931.54*** 1626.71*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  39 39 39 39 39 39 
Observations  366 366 366 366 366 366 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586. na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient needed for the computation of the net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. 
Table 2: Governance, Inequality and Female Unemployment  
       
 Dependent variable: Female Unemployment (FU) 
       
 Political Governance Economic  Governance Institutional  Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectivness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
FU (-1) 0.910*** 0.918*** 0.884*** 0.906*** 0.841*** 0.949*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) 7.943*** 8.021*** 4.849** 6.596*** 9.648*** 3.158 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.001) (0.220) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) -2.798** --- --- --- --- --- 
14 
 
 (0.024)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- -5.841*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- -1.215 --- --- --- 
   (0.465)    
Regulatory quality (RQ) --- --- --- -1.677 --- --- 
    (0.212)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- -6.075** --- 
     (0.011)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 2.559* 
      (0.051) 
Gini × PolS 4.987** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.028)      
Gini × VA --- 10.121*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Gini × GE --- --- 2.876 --- --- --- 
   (0.346)    
Gini × RQ --- --- --- 3.065 --- --- 
    (0.197)   
Gini × RL --- --- --- --- 13.061*** --- 
     (0.002)  
Gini × CC --- --- --- --- --- -4.646** 
      (0.037) 
Mobile Phone Penetration  -0.0002 0.002** 0.003 0.003** -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.938) (0.039) (0.170) (0.017) (0.429) (0.102) 
Remittances  0.083*** 0.010 0.017* 0.0002 0.027 -0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.209) (0.091) (0.965) (0.190) (0.003) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Thresholds 0.561 0.577 na na 0.465 0.550 
       
AR(1) (0.202)  (0.196) (0.198) (0.198) (0.201) (0.036) 
AR(2) (0.378) (0.365) (0.382) (0.385) (0.351) (0.429) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.057) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) 
Hansen OIR (0.698) (0.032) (0.069) (0.109) (0.416) (0.351) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.264) (0.292) (0.279) (0.417) (0.422) (0.120) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.810) (0.029) (0.067) (0.084) (0.390) (0.568) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.333) (0.032) (0.328) (0.228) (0.536) (0.470) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.825) (0.164) (0.053) (0.128) (0.322) (0.288) 
       
Fisher  19656.61*** 15366.52*** 5546.38*** 61088*** 2526.32*** 1626.71*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586.na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient needed for the computation of the net effects is not significant.Constants are included in all regressions.  
Table 3: Governance, Inequality and Female Employment  
       
 Dependent variable: Female Eemployment (FE) 
       
 Political Governance Economic  Governance Institutional  Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectivness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
FE (-1) 0.976*** 0.953*** 0.963*** 0.988*** 0.954*** 0.971*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) -3.651*** -1.717 -2.445 -3.474*** -5.964*** -3.773* 
 (0.001) (0.429) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 2.034** --- --- --- --- --- 
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 (0.035)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 6.750*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 3.725** --- --- --- 
   (0.041)    
Regulatory quality (RQ) --- --- --- 1.561 --- --- 
    (0.221)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 6.107*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 2.552 
      (0.193) 
Gini × PolS -3.341* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.055)      
Gini × VA --- -11.637*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.003)     
Gini × GE --- --- -6.411** --- --- --- 
   (0.052)    
Gini × RQ --- --- --- -1.938 --- --- 
    (0.376)   
Gini × RL --- --- --- --- -10.952*** --- 
     (0.001)  
Gini × CC --- --- --- --- --- -4.050 
      (0.288) 
Mobile Phone Penetration  -0.0005 -0.007** -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007* 
 (0.834) (0.030) (0.155) (0.261) (0.268) (0.056) 
Remittances  -0.049*** -0.015 -0.010 -0.014** 0.0009 -0.012 
 (0.000) (0.112) (0.192) (0.011) (0.884) (0.214) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Thresholds 0.608 0.580 0.581 na 0.557 na 
       
AR(1) (0.140) (0.152) (0.145) (0.143) (0.141) (0.148) 
AR(2) (0.276) (0.309) (0.304) (0.289) (0.249) (0.300) 
Sargan OIR (0.006) (0.242) (0.087) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.757) (0.784) (0.858) (0.875) (0.321) (0.726) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.178) (0.396) (0.189) (0.434) (0.340) (0.109) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.923) (0.821) (0.976) (0.902) (0.326) (0.955) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff)) (0.288) (0.412) (0.622) (0.403) (0.405) (0.451) 
H excluding group (0.919) (0.863) (0.830) (0.957) (0.290) (0.764) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous)       
       
Fisher  440766*** 370965*** 2379.24*** 794776*** 119202*** 2472.08*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586. na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient neededfor the computation of the net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. 
3.2 Further discussion of results  
 The research question motivating this study has centred on the assessment of  the levels of 
income inequality that reduce the effectiveness of governance in tailoring conducive policies that 
ultimately promote the participation of more women in the formal economic sector. In order to 
make this assessment, two main hypotheses have been tested. The empirical findings have largely 
validated the tested hypotheses because: (i) governance standards unconditionally increase female 
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participation in the labour force and female employment (i.e. in Table 1 and Table 3) and also 
unconditionally decrease female unemployment (i.e. Table 2). The positive unconditional effect 
of governance validates Hypothesis 1. (ii) As for Hypothesis 2, it is apparent that income inequality 
interacts with governance to reduce female participation in the labour force and female 
employment (i.e. in Table 1 and Table 3) and also increase female unemployment (i.e. Table 2). 
This negative conditional effect thus validates Hypothesis 2.  
 The validation of the tested hypotheses is broadly consistent with the literature supporting 
the perspective that government-led actions that are designed to boost economic development in 
view of increasing inclusive development can be attenuated by the existing level of income 
inequality (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2015; Tchamyou, 2019c;  Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2018) 
are some studies broadly supporting the validated hypotheses. The corresponding policy 
implications are discussed in the concluding section.   
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions  
 
The study assesses critical thresholds of inequality at which good governance is no longer relevant 
in promoting gender economic inclusion. The scope of the study consists of 42 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa with data for the period 2004-2014.  Three gender economic indicators are used, 
namely: female labour force economic participation, female unemployment and female 
employment. Inequality is proxied with the Gini coefficient while the six governance indicators 
used are: (i) political governance (consisting of political stability and “voice & accountability); (ii) 
economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and regulatory quality) and institutional 
governance (encompassing corruption-control and the rule of law). The empirical evidence is 
based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).  
The following findings are established.  First, inequality levels that completely nullify the 
positive effect of governance on female labour force participation are: 0.708 (for political 
stability); 0.601 (“voice & accountability”); 0.588 (government effectiveness); 0.631 (regulatory 
quality); 0.612 (rule of law) and 0.550 (for corruption-control). Second, inequality thresholds at 
which female unemployment can no longer be mitigated by governance channels are 0.561 (for 
political stability) and 0.465 (for the rule of law). Third, inequality levels that completely dampen 
the positive impact of governance on female employment are: 0.608 (for political stability); 0.580 
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(“voice & accountability”); 0.581(government effectiveness) and 0.557 (rule of law). As a main 
policy implication, in order for good governance to continue promoting female economic 
inclusion, inequality levels should not exceed established thresholds.  
It is important for policy makers to, therefore, limit inequality because such reduction will 
not only boost the participation of women in the formal economic sector but will also enhance the 
negative response of extreme poverty to economic growth in the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda in SSA. This inference is consistent with the premise of this research – which 
is that the effectiveness of governance in promoting inclusive development is hampered by 
existing levels of income inequality. It is relevant to recall that about half of countries in the sub-
region failed to attain the MDG extreme poverty target in spite of the sub-region having 
experienced more than two decades of growth resurgence. Hence, reduction of income inequality 
will not exclusively contribute towards the achievement of the SDGs motivating this study, 
notably: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. “achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”) and (ii) SDG 
8 (i.e. “promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all”). Moreover, policies designed to promote gender economic 
participation also have externalities in the structural distribution of labour, reduction of poverty 
and improvement in the general welfare. In a nutshell, these will go a long way to addressing most 
poverty- and inequality-related SDGs in the sub-region.   
 Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing the established findings within 
country-specific frameworks in order to provide room for more targeted policy implications. It is 
also worthwhile to clarify that the GMM approach used in this study is designed to eliminate 
country-specific effects in order to avoid a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
such country-specific effects which is a cause of endogeneity.  Another caveat is that the Gini 
coefficient which, is used to measure income inequality because of its wide usage in the literature, 
has the shortcoming of not capturing tails or extreme points of the inequality distribution. Hence, 
it would be worthwhile for future studies to take on board measures of inequality that are sensitive 
to outliers of inequality, inter alia: the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio. Within this framework, 
alternative estimation techniques that are designed to capture outliers of outcome variables such 
as quantile regressions are also recommended. Given that the robustness of these alternative 
techniques is not constrained by instrument proliferation like in the GMM estimation technique, 
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other key variables such as output or output components and real wage rate should be included in 
the conditioning information set. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
 
FLFP Labor force participation rate, female (% of female 
population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
   
19 
 
Female Economic 
Participation   
FU Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
   
FE Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
    
Political Stability  PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism” 
WGI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a 
free media” 
 
WGI 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
 
 
WGI 
    
 
Regulatory quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulatory quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Corruption-Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WGI 
    
Gini Coefficient  Gini  “The Gini coefficient is a measurement of the income 
distribution of a country's residents”. 
GCIP 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile  Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank. WGI: World Governance Indicators of the World. ILO: International Labour 
Organisation. GCIP: Global Consumption and Income Project.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
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Female Labor Force participation  130.03 83.996 1.000 287.00 462 
Female Unemployment, female 58.273 44.334 1.000 152.00 462 
Female Employment  113.19 69.850 1.000 256.00 462 
Political Stability  -0.490 0.867 -2.687 1.182 528 
Voice & Accountability -0.509 0.683 -1.780 0.970 462 
Government Effectiveness -0.711 0.599 -1.867 1.035 462 
Regulatory quality -0.608 0.529 -1.879 1.123 462 
Corruption-Control -0.577 0.590 -1.513 1.139 462 
Rule of Law -0.651 0.604 -1.816 1.007 462 
Gini Coefficient  0.586 0.034 0.488 0.851 461 
Mobile Phone Penetration  45.330 37.282 0.209 171.375 558 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 378) 
             
FLFP  FU FE PolS VA GE RQ CC RL Gini Mobile Remit  
1.000 -0.281 0.946 0.079 -0.120 -0.005 -0.004 -0.040 -0.038 -0.039 -0.224 -0.185 FLFP 
 1.000 -0.568 0.311 0.260 0.366 0.306 0.399 0.369 0.376 0.237 0.270 FU 
  1.000 -0.043 -0.206 -0.118 -0.101 -0.163 -0.151 -0.148 -0.267 -0.255 FE 
   1.000 0.724 0.656 0.674 0.736 0.778 0.335 0.293 0.070 PolS 
    1.000 0.721 0.741 0.712 0.797 0.241 0.375 0.058 VA 
     1.000 0.915 0.840 0.902 0.308 0.423 -0.124 GE 
      1.000 0.781 0.879 0.323 0.508 -0.159 RQ 
       1.000 0.892 0.342 0.381 0.092 CC 
        1.000 0.270 0.424 0.008 RL 
         1.000 0.145 0.055 Gini 
          1.000 -0.032 Mobile 
           1.000 Remit 
             
FLFP: Female Labour Force participation. FU: Female Unemployment. FE: Female Employment. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & 
Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulatory quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Gini: Gini Coefficient. Mobile: 
Mobile Phone Penetration. Remit: Remittances.  
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